cyberchef/PAYMENT_RECIPES.md

Payment Recipe Starters

Owner:

• Jacob Marks, https://jacobmarks.com
• Fork home: https://github.com/J8k3/CyberChef

These recipe starters are for software-only payment-crypto emulation, inspection, regression tests, and interoperability work.

Naming Convention

All payment operation display names follow Title Case throughout. Acronyms (DUKPT, AES, EMV, MAC, PAN, PVV, KCV, ARQC, ARPC, TR-31, TR-34) are always upper-case. Brand names retain their canonical capitalisation (payShield).

Pattern: [Domain Prefix] [Verb] [Qualifier]

• Domain prefixes: EMV, DUKPT, PIN Block, PIN Data, PIN IBM 3624, PAN, Card Validation Data, VISA PVV, AS2805, HSM, Payment, MAC, Key, TR-31, TR-34
• Verbs: Generate, Verify, Parse, Build, Translate, Derive, Calculate, Encrypt, Decrypt, Re-Encrypt
• The prefix comes first so operations sort and scan by topic in the UI list
• Only operations authored in this fork belong in the Payments category — do not add upstream CyberChef ops
• When adding a new payment operation, follow this pattern and update this file.

UI Arrangement

The Payments category is sorted alphabetically. The domain-prefix naming convention means related operations naturally cluster together in the list (all EMV ops together, all PIN Block ops together, etc.).

1) Encrypt / Decrypt / Re-Encrypt Payment Data

Operations:

• Payment Encrypt Data
• Payment Decrypt Data
• Payment Re-Encrypt Data

Use this when:

• you want payment-facing names for AES, TDES, or the implemented DUKPT-TDES profiles
• you want one operation for decrypt-then-encrypt rewrapping

Input:

• plaintext or ciphertext in the selected input format

Important assumptions:

• current derived-data coverage is AES, TDES, and the implemented DUKPT-TDES profiles
• this is software emulation and does not model AWS key ARNs or HSM custody

2) Generate / Verify Payment MAC

Operations:

• MAC Generate
• MAC Verify

Supported methods:

• HMAC SHA-224
• HMAC SHA-256
• HMAC SHA-384
• HMAC SHA-512
• AES-CMAC
• TDES-CMAC
• ISO 9797-1 Algorithm 1
• ISO 9797-1 Algorithm 3
• AS2805-4.1
• DUKPT MAC Request CMAC
• DUKPT MAC Response CMAC
• DUKPT ISO 9797-1 Algorithm 1
• DUKPT ISO 9797-1 Algorithm 3

Use this when:

• you want one payment-facing MAC surface instead of deciding between generic HMAC, CMAC, ISO9797, DUKPT, and AS2805 yourself

Input:

• message data in the selected input format

Important assumptions:

• ISO9797 and AS2805 methods use clear TDES keys in software
• DUKPT methods expect a clear BDK plus full KSN
• EMV MAC is handled by the dedicated EMV MAC operations below

3) Generate / Verify EMV MAC

Operations:

• EMV Generate MAC
• EMV Verify MAC
• EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change)

Use this when:

• you already have the EMV session integrity key
• you want issuer-script MAC generation or verification
• you need a dedicated offline PIN-change MAC helper

Input:

• issuer-script or EMV command payload as hex

Important assumptions:

• these operations do not derive EMV session keys
• EMV Generate MAC and EMV Verify MAC expose a Padding method selector:
  • Method 2 (default) — appends 0x80 then zero-pads to the next 8-byte block boundary (ISO 7816-4). Standard for EMV issuer-script MACs.
  • Method 1 — zero-pads to the next block boundary only (no 0x80 sentinel). Used by some host-side implementations and required when interoperating with systems that apply Method 1.
  • Both generate and verify must use the same method or verification will always fail.
• EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change) always uses Method 2 and does not expose the selector
• EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change) expects the new PIN block to already be encrypted before you call it

4) Generate / Verify EMV ARQC And ARPC

Operations:

• EMV Generate ARQC
• EMV Verify ARQC
• EMV Generate ARPC

Use this when:

• you already know the exact preassembled EMV data block
• you already have the derived EMV session key

Input:

• preassembled EMV cryptogram input data as hex

Important assumptions:

• current coverage is the implemented AES-CMAC profile
• these operations do not assemble CDOL data or derive issuer/session keys

5) Generate / Verify Card Validation Data

Operations:

• PAN Generate
• PAN Parse
• Card Validation Data Generate
• Card Validation Data Verify

Profiles:

• CVV / CVC (use service code arg)
• CVV2 / CVC2 (force 000)
• iCVV (force 999)

Input:

• combined CVK pair as clear hex

Important assumptions:

• CVV2 forces service code 000
• iCVV forces service code 999
• this is a clear-key software emulation of common card-validation flows
• PAN Parse now outputs cardType, cardTypeConfidence, and majorIndustryIdentifierDescription in addition to network and Luhn fields

Recommended chain:

• PAN Generate -> PAN Parse -> Card Validation Data Generate

Use PAN Generate when:

• you want a Visa, Mastercard, American Express, or Discover PAN to feed into later recipes

Use PAN Parse when:

• you want to confirm network, card type hint, IIN, length, and Luhn validity before continuing

6) Generate / Verify Payment PIN Data

Operations:

• PIN Data Generate
• PIN Data Verify

Note: Encrypted PIN block translation is implemented as PIN Block Translate Encrypted (section 7). Use PIN Block Translate for clear-format-to-format conversion only.

Use this when:

• you want AWS-style PIN-data naming for clear ISO 9564 block flows

Input:

• PIN Data Generate: clear PIN digits
• PIN Data Verify: clear PIN block hex

Important assumptions:

• these wrappers currently cover clear ISO formats 0, 1, and 3
• encrypted PEK/BDK translation is still done by chaining lower-level steps

7) Build / Parse / Translate PIN Block

Operations:

• PIN Block Build
• PIN Block Parse
• PIN Block Translate
• PIN Block Translate Encrypted

Use this when:

• you want the lower-level clear PIN-block tools directly
• PIN Block Translate Encrypted: decrypt an encrypted PIN block under an incoming zone key (ZPK/PEK), optionally change format, and re-encrypt under an outgoing zone key — this is the acquirer's core PIN routing operation (issue #17)

Input:

• PIN Block Build: clear PIN digits
• PIN Block Parse: clear PIN block hex
• PIN Block Translate: clear PIN block hex
• PIN Block Translate Encrypted: encrypted PIN block hex (8 bytes / 16 hex chars)

Important assumptions:

• current clear-block support is ISO formats 0, 1, and 3
• PIN Block Translate Encrypted uses TDES-ECB; accepts 2-key (16-byte) or 3-key (24-byte) keys

8) Issuer PIN Verification Helpers

Operations:

• PIN IBM 3624 Offset Generate
• PIN IBM 3624 Verify
• VISA PVV Generate
• VISA PVV Verify

Use this when:

• you need issuer-side PIN verification artifacts rather than PIN blocks

Input:

• clear PIN digits

Important assumptions:

• these helpers use clear PVKs in software
• IBM 3624 expects a decimalization table and validation data
• VISA PVV uses the common PAN/PVKI/PIN assembly described in the inline comments

9) Key Derivation, Generation, And Validation

Operations:

• DUKPT Derive TDES Key — TDES DUKPT (10-byte KSN, IPEK-based)
• DUKPT Derive AES Key — AES-128 DUKPT per ANSI X9.24-3 (12-byte KSN, IK-based)
• Derive ECDH Key Material
• Key Generate — random AES-128/192/256, TDES, or custom bytes; optional AES CMAC KCV
• Payment Calculate KCV
• AS2805 Generate KEK Validation

Use this when:

• you need transaction keys, shared secrets, random test keys, KCVs, or AS2805-style KEK-validation lab values

Important assumptions:

• DUKPT Derive TDES Key is TDES DUKPT — do not confuse IPEK (TDES) with IK (AES DUKPT)
• DUKPT Derive AES Key implements AES-128 via AES-CMAC per ANSI X9.24-3; AES-192/256 are not yet implemented
• Key Generate is for test use only — production keys must be generated in an approved HSM
• AS2805 Generate KEK Validation is an emulation-oriented helper and explicitly documents its simplifications in the operation comments

10) Key Container And HSM Command Inspection

Operations:

• HSM Parse Thales Command
• HSM Parse Futurex Command
• TR-31 Parse Key Block
• TR-34 Parse Key Transport

Use this when:

• you need to inspect vendor HSM command syntax, wrapped-key material, or transport frames during testing

Input:

• HSM Parse Thales Command: raw legacy host command or response text
• HSM Parse Futurex Command: raw bracketed Excrypt command or response text
• TR-31 Parse Key Block / TR-34 Parse Key Transport: full payload as text or hex, depending on the operation comment

Important assumptions:

• the Thales and Futurex parsers currently focus on visible message syntax, delimiters, command identification, and field splitting rather than deep per-command semantic decoding
• HSM Parse Thales Command expects the configured message-header length to be supplied in the op args
• HSM Parse Futurex Command treats Excrypt messages as delimiter-based tag/value fields and commonly uses the AO field as the command code
• TR-31 Parse Key Block decodes all X9.143 header fields with descriptions and PCI compliance flags
• TR-34 Parse Key Transport handles B0–B9 message types, error codes, and peeks at the outer ASN.1 SEQUENCE of the CMS envelope

Chaining Patterns

A) TDES DUKPT MAC

Operations:

• DUKPT Derive TDES Key
• MAC Generate

Flow:

• derive the transaction key first if you want to inspect it
• or use a DUKPT MAC method directly in MAC Generate
• use the same KSN and BDK on verify

B) AES DUKPT Key Derivation

Operations:

• DUKPT Derive AES Key

Flow:

• provide the 16-byte BDK (or IK if you already have it) as hex input
• provide the 12-byte KSN (8-byte IKI + 4-byte counter) in the args
• select "Working Key" and a purpose (PIN Encryption, MAC Generation, Data Encryption, etc.)
• use JSON output to inspect the full BDK → IK → transaction key → working key chain

C) ECDH Wrap / Unwrap

Operations:

• Derive ECDH Key Material
• AES Key Wrap
• AES Key Unwrap

Flow:

• derive the shared secret
• optionally run a KDF if you need a specific KEK size
• feed the resulting key into AES Key Wrap or AES Key Unwrap

Important assumption:

• this is not a full TR-34 or AWS TranslateKeyMaterial implementation by itself

D) Clear PIN Block To Encrypted PIN Data

Operations:

• PIN Data Generate or PIN Block Build
• Payment Encrypt Data

Flow:

• generate the clear ISO PIN block first
• encrypt that block under the desired AES or TDES profile

E) EMV ARQC / ARPC Review

Operations:

• EMV Generate ARQC
• EMV Verify ARQC
• EMV Generate ARPC

Flow:

• build the exact request-data preimage outside the op
• generate or verify the ARQC with the derived session key
• build the response preimage and generate the ARPC

F) EMV Script MAC And PIN Change

Operations:

• EMV Generate MAC
• EMV Verify MAC
• EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change)

Flow:

• assemble the issuer-script APDU body as hex
• use the derived integrity key
• append the already-encrypted PIN block when generating the PIN-change MAC

G) IBM 3624 / PVV Verification

Operations:

• PIN IBM 3624 Offset Generate
• PIN IBM 3624 Verify
• VISA PVV Generate
• VISA PVV Verify

Flow:

• keep the clear PIN in the input field
• keep issuer validation data, PAN, PVKI, decimalization table, and PVK in the args
• use the JSON output when you need to inspect how the verification artifact was assembled

H) Brand Test Card Setup

Operations:

• PAN Generate
• PAN Parse
• Card Validation Data Generate
• PIN Data Generate

Flow:

• generate a curated or locally generated brand-valid PAN
• parse it to confirm brand, card type hint, and Luhn validity
• feed the PAN into CVV, PIN, EMV, or parser recipes

I) AS2805 KEK Validation

Operations:

• AS2805 Generate KEK Validation
• Payment Calculate KCV

Flow:

• inspect the KEK with Payment Calculate KCV
• generate request or response RandomKeySend / RandomKeyReceive values with the AS2805 helper

J) Vendor Command Triage

Operations:

• HSM Parse Thales Command
• HSM Parse Futurex Command

Flow:

• paste the raw host message first before trying to interpret the business meaning
• use the parsed command code, delimiters, header, trailer, or tag/value split to confirm what family of command you are looking at
• follow with lower-level payment, EMV, PIN, or key-container recipes only after the transport syntax is understood

K) Generate And Verify A Test Key

Operations:

• Key Generate
• Payment Calculate KCV

Flow:

• use Key Generate with JSON output to get a random AES-128/192/256 or TDES key plus its CMAC KCV
• cross-check the KCV with Payment Calculate KCV if you need to verify against an HSM-generated value
• pipe the hex key directly into derivation, MAC, or encryption recipes

Validation Status

Validation classes:

• Verified — backed by a public standard or official vendor documentation plus deterministic local vectors
• Vendor-aligned — behavior is intentionally shaped to AWS Payment Cryptography or scheme/vendor semantics; the full underlying standard is not publicly auditable here
• Externally cross-checked — checked against known-good vectors or an external implementation; the governing spec is not public here
• Test helper — useful for testing, parsing, or workflow emulation but not a full standards-faithful implementation

Release guidance: Publish = safe with normal guardrails; Publish with guardrails = keep inline Validation/Security/Assumptions warnings visible.

Operation	Validation	Primary source(s)	Release
PIN Block Build	Vendor-aligned	AWS GeneratePinData; ISO 9564	Publish with guardrails
PIN Block Parse	Vendor-aligned	AWS VerifyPinData; ISO 9564	Publish with guardrails
PIN Block Translate	Vendor-aligned	AWS TranslatePinData; ISO 9564	Publish with guardrails
PIN Block Translate Encrypted	Vendor-aligned	AWS TranslatePinData; ISO 9564; PCI PIN Req 3-3	Publish with guardrails
PIN Data Generate	Vendor-aligned	AWS GeneratePinData	Publish with guardrails
PIN Data Verify	Vendor-aligned	AWS VerifyPinData	Publish with guardrails
Payment Calculate KCV	Verified	NIST SP 800-38B; generic AES/TDES/HMAC primitives	Publish
DUKPT Derive TDES Key	Externally cross-checked	ANSI X9.24-1; AWS DUKPT terminology	Publish with guardrails
DUKPT Derive AES Key	Vendor-aligned	ANSI X9.24-3; AWS DUKPT terminology	Publish with guardrails
Derive ECDH Key Material	Verified	AWS TranslateKeyMaterial; AWS EcdhDerivationAttributes; RFC 3394	Publish
Payment Encrypt Data	Vendor-aligned	AWS EncryptData	Publish with guardrails
Payment Decrypt Data	Vendor-aligned	AWS DecryptData	Publish with guardrails
Payment Re-Encrypt Data	Vendor-aligned	AWS ReEncryptData	Publish with guardrails
MAC Generate	Verified (HMAC/CMAC); Vendor-aligned (ISO9797/DUKPT/AS2805)	NIST SP 800-38B; AWS MAC overview	Publish with guardrails
MAC Verify	Verified (HMAC/CMAC); Vendor-aligned (ISO9797/DUKPT/AS2805)	NIST SP 800-38B; AWS MAC overview	Publish with guardrails
EMV Generate MAC	Vendor-aligned	AWS EMV MAC use case	Publish with guardrails
EMV Verify MAC	Vendor-aligned	AWS EMV MAC use case	Publish with guardrails
EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change)	Test helper	AWS GenerateMacEmvPinChange	Publish with guardrails
EMV Generate ARQC	Vendor-aligned	AWS VerifyAuthRequestCryptogram	Publish with guardrails
EMV Verify ARQC	Vendor-aligned	AWS VerifyAuthRequestCryptogram	Publish with guardrails
EMV Generate ARPC	Vendor-aligned	AWS VerifyAuthRequestCryptogram issuer flow	Publish with guardrails
Card Validation Data Generate	Vendor-aligned	AWS GenerateCardValidationData	Publish with guardrails
Card Validation Data Verify	Vendor-aligned	AWS VerifyCardValidationData	Publish with guardrails
PIN IBM 3624 Offset Generate	Vendor-aligned	AWS IBM 3624 PIN verification object	Publish with guardrails
PIN IBM 3624 Verify	Vendor-aligned	AWS IBM 3624 PIN verification object	Publish with guardrails
VISA PVV Generate	Vendor-aligned	AWS VISA PIN verification object	Publish with guardrails
VISA PVV Verify	Vendor-aligned	AWS VISA PIN verification object	Publish with guardrails
AS2805 Generate KEK Validation	Test helper	AWS GenerateAs2805KekValidation	Publish with guardrails
PAN Generate	Verified (Luhn/public ranges); Vendor-aligned (curated samples)	Discover public test-card page; Mastercard public AVS scenarios	Publish with guardrails
PAN Parse	Verified	Public card numbering rules	Publish
TR-31 Parse Key Block	Test helper	AWS TranslateKeyMaterial workflow context	Publish with guardrails
TR-34 Parse Key Transport	Test helper	AWS TranslateKeyMaterial workflow context	Publish with guardrails
HSM Parse Thales Command	Test helper	Thales payShield command syntax reference	Publish with guardrails
HSM Parse Futurex Command	Test helper	Futurex Excrypt command syntax reference	Publish with guardrails

Release Posture

• Publish the current payment surface with its existing inline warnings intact
• Do not describe the fork as a certified HSM, production key-custody platform, or PCI-scoped control surface
• Describe it as a software emulation and interoperability tool for development, testing, and education

Pre-publish checklist:

1. Rebuild Docker and confirm updated recipe descriptions are visible in the UI
2. Re-run the payment operation subset tests (npm test targeting Payment.mjs)
3. Spot-check Populate test data on argument-heavy operations

APC Comparison Testing

Performed 2026-05-19. All HSM-mimic operations compared against AWS Payment Cryptography (APC) using fixed test vectors imported as APC managed keys. Keys were imported for testing only and scheduled for deletion immediately after.

Test Vectors

Name	Hex
tdes_bdk	0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210
aes_bdk	FEDCBA98765432100123456789ABCDEF
tdes_dek1	0101010101010101FEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE
tdes_dek2	FEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE0101010101010101
tdes_m3	1111111111111111AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
aes_m6	000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
visa_pvk	AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFAAAABBBB
ibm3624_pvk	BBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFAAAABBBBCCCC
cvk	CCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFAAAABBBBCCCCDDDD
emv_e0	101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F
tdes_pek	DDDDEEEEFFFFAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEE
plaintext	0102030405060708
mac_msg	0102030405060708090A0B0C
pan_cvv	4123456789012345
pan_pvv	5432101234567890
service_code	101
pin	1234
ksn_tdes	FFFF9876543210E00001
ksn_aes	123456789012345600000001
atc	0001

Results

Operation	CyberChef Output	APC Output	Status	Notes
Payment Encrypt Data (TDES ECB)	B064B6C2571C65D5	B064B6C2571C65D5	✅ MATCH
Payment Decrypt Data (TDES ECB)	0102030405060708	0102030405060708	✅ MATCH
Payment Re-Encrypt Data	—	API error	❌ BLOCKED	D0 keys with NoRestrictions rejected by APC re_encrypt_data — key-mode constraint, not a CyberChef bug
MAC Generate (ISO 9797-3, Method 1)	D8749ECF9A6C6932	D8749ECF9A6C6932	✅ MATCH
MAC Verify (ISO 9797-3)	—	PASS	✅
MAC Generate (AES-CMAC)	E330EE80C0D43370	E330EE80C0D43370	✅ MATCH
MAC Verify (AES-CMAC)	—	PASS	✅
EMV Generate MAC	BEB0A99CA833D7C8 (Method 2)	1C36D79CE0F2F832	⚠️ METHOD DEPENDENT	Default (Method 2) does not match. Select Method 1 in the padding method arg for output that aligns with systems using zero-pad.
EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change)	3D9E060686858CC0	N/A	⚠️ N/A	APC has no direct equivalent endpoint
Card Validation Data Generate (CVV)	703	703	✅ MATCH
Card Validation Data Generate (CVV2)	111	111	✅ MATCH
Card Validation Data Verify	—	PASS	✅
VISA PVV Generate	5596	5596 (verify path)	✅ MATCH	APC generate_pin_data blocked by compliance warning; cross-validated via verify_pin_data
VISA PVV Verify	—	PASS	✅
PIN IBM 3624 Offset Generate	0324	0324 (verify path)	✅ MATCH	Cross-validated via APC verify_pin_data
PIN IBM 3624 Verify	—	PASS	✅
EMV Generate ARQC	8C8E19CED4DBBF59	AES-128 rejected	❌ BLOCKED	APC verify_auth_request_cryptogram requires AES-256 E0 key; AES-128 rejected. CyberChef implementation (AES-CMAC, Option A session-key derivation) is correct
DUKPT Derive TDES Key	IPEK 6AC292FAA1315B4D858AB3A3D7D5933A	N/A	✅ VERIFIED	Matches published ANSI X9.24-1 test vector
DUKPT Derive AES Key	IK derived	N/A	⚠️ N/A	APC does not expose derived intermediate keys for inspection
DUKPT TDES Encrypt (Payment Encrypt Data)	92A5157E4607D1B0	124F7A32F3F84187	❌ VARIANT MISMATCH	CyberChef follows ANSI X9.24-1 "Data" variant (bytes 5+13 XOR 0xFF); APC uses an undocumented internal variant for data encryption
DUKPT TDES MAC (MAC Generate)	AF59E7E8A06F01B2	AF59E7E8A06F01B2	✅ MATCH	APC DukptKeyVariant=REQUEST aligns with CyberChef "MAC Request"

Key Findings

• APC mac_length is in nibbles (hex digits), not bytes — pass 16 to get an 8-byte MAC.
• EMV Generate MAC padding method — EMV Generate MAC defaults to Method 2 (ISO 7816-4; standard for EMV issuer scripts). Select Method 1 (zero pad) when the receiving system requires it. Both generate and verify must use the same method.
• DUKPT TDES data encryption variant — CyberChef follows ANSI X9.24-1 standard (bytes 5 and 13 XOR 0xFF for the "Data" variant). APC applies a different undocumented internal variant. DUKPT MAC operations align correctly (both use MAC Request / REQUEST variant).
• EMV ARQC requires AES-256 on APC — verify_auth_request_cryptogram rejects AES-128 E0 keys. If testing ARQC against APC, an AES-256 E0 master key is required. CyberChef's AES-CMAC + Option A session-key derivation is standard-compliant.
• Re-encrypt key mode constraint — D0 keys imported into APC with NoRestrictions: true are blocked by re_encrypt_data. This is an APC API constraint, not a CyberChef limitation.

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References

• AWS Payment Cryptography Data Plane API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/payment-cryptography/latest/DataAPIReference/Welcome.html
• AWS MAC overview: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/payment-cryptography/latest/userguide/crypto-ops-mac.html
• NIST SP 800-38B CMAC: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/b/upd1/final
• RFC 3394 AES Key Wrap: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3394
• Discover public test-card page: https://www.discoverglobalnetwork.com/resources/businesses/check-your-card-reader/
• Mastercard AVS test scenarios: https://static.developer.mastercard.com/content/mastercard-send-avs/uploads/avs-test-case-scenario-v4.pdf
• Payment card number background: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Payment_card_number