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cyberchef/PAYMENT_RECIPES.md
J8k3 28cda9bad9 Add Key Component Split and Combine operations (issue #2) 
XOR key ceremony helpers: split a key into 2-8 components and recombine.
Chains cleanly with Key Generate and wrap/encrypt operations.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 22:06:32 -04:00

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# Payment Recipe Starters
Owner:
- Jacob Marks, `https://jacobmarks.com`
- Fork home: `https://github.com/J8k3/CyberChef`
These recipe starters are for software-only payment-crypto emulation, inspection, regression tests, and interoperability work.
## Naming Convention
All payment operation display names follow **Title Case** throughout. Acronyms (DUKPT, AES, EMV, MAC, PAN, PVV, KCV, ARQC, ARPC, TR-31, TR-34) are always upper-case. Brand names retain their canonical capitalisation (`payShield`).
Pattern: `[Domain Prefix] [Verb] [Qualifier]`
- Domain prefixes: EMV, DUKPT, PIN Block, PIN Data, PIN IBM 3624, PAN, Card Validation Data, VISA PVV, AS2805, HSM, Payment, MAC, Key, TR-31, TR-34
- Verbs: Generate, Verify, Parse, Build, Translate, Derive, Calculate, Encrypt, Decrypt, Re-Encrypt
- The prefix comes first so operations sort and scan by topic in the UI list
- Only operations authored in this fork belong in the Payments category — do not add upstream CyberChef ops
- When adding a new payment operation, follow this pattern and update this file.
## UI Arrangement
The `Payments` category is sorted alphabetically. The domain-prefix naming convention means related operations naturally cluster together in the list (all EMV ops together, all PIN Block ops together, etc.).
## 1) Encrypt / Decrypt / Re-Encrypt Payment Data
Operations:
- `Payment Encrypt Data`
- `Payment Decrypt Data`
- `Payment Re-Encrypt Data`
Use this when:
- you want payment-facing names for AES, TDES, or the implemented DUKPT-TDES profiles
- you want one operation for decrypt-then-encrypt rewrapping
Input:
- plaintext or ciphertext in the selected input format
Important assumptions:
- current derived-data coverage is AES, TDES, and the implemented DUKPT-TDES profiles
- this is software emulation and does not model AWS key ARNs or HSM custody
## 2) Generate / Verify Payment MAC
Operations:
- `MAC Generate`
- `MAC Verify`
Supported methods:
- `HMAC SHA-224`
- `HMAC SHA-256`
- `HMAC SHA-384`
- `HMAC SHA-512`
- `AES-CMAC`
- `TDES-CMAC`
- `ISO 9797-1 Algorithm 1`
- `ISO 9797-1 Algorithm 3`
- `AS2805-4.1`
- `DUKPT MAC Request CMAC`
- `DUKPT MAC Response CMAC`
- `DUKPT ISO 9797-1 Algorithm 1`
- `DUKPT ISO 9797-1 Algorithm 3`
Use this when:
- you want one payment-facing MAC surface instead of deciding between generic `HMAC`, `CMAC`, ISO9797, DUKPT, and AS2805 yourself
Input:
- message data in the selected input format
Important assumptions:
- ISO9797 and AS2805 methods use clear TDES keys in software
- DUKPT methods expect a clear BDK plus full KSN
- EMV MAC is handled by the dedicated EMV MAC operations below
## 3) Generate / Verify EMV MAC
Operations:
- `EMV Generate MAC`
- `EMV Verify MAC`
- `EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change)`
Use this when:
- you already have the EMV session integrity key
- you want issuer-script MAC generation or verification
- you need a dedicated offline PIN-change MAC helper
Input:
- issuer-script or EMV command payload as hex
Important assumptions:
- these operations do not derive EMV session keys
- `EMV Generate MAC` and `EMV Verify MAC` expose a **Padding method** selector:
- **Method 2 (default)** — appends `0x80` then zero-pads to the next 8-byte block boundary (ISO 7816-4). Standard for EMV issuer-script MACs.
- **Method 1** — zero-pads to the next block boundary only (no `0x80` sentinel). Used by some host-side implementations and required when interoperating with systems that apply Method 1.
- Both generate and verify must use the same method or verification will always fail.
- `EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change)` always uses Method 2 and does not expose the selector
- `EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change)` expects the new PIN block to already be encrypted before you call it
## 4) Generate / Verify EMV ARQC And ARPC
Operations:
- `EMV Generate ARQC`
- `EMV Verify ARQC`
- `EMV Generate ARPC`
Use this when:
- you already know the exact preassembled EMV data block
- you already have the derived EMV session key
Input:
- preassembled EMV cryptogram input data as hex
Important assumptions:
- current coverage is the implemented AES-CMAC profile
- these operations do not assemble CDOL data or derive issuer/session keys
## 5) Generate / Verify Card Validation Data
Operations:
- `PAN Generate`
- `PAN Parse`
- `Card Validation Data Generate`
- `Card Validation Data Verify`
Profiles:
- `CVV / CVC (use service code arg)`
- `CVV2 / CVC2 (force 000)`
- `iCVV (force 999)`
Input:
- combined CVK pair as clear hex
Important assumptions:
- CVV2 forces service code `000`
- iCVV forces service code `999`
- this is a clear-key software emulation of common card-validation flows
- `PAN Parse` now outputs `cardType`, `cardTypeConfidence`, and `majorIndustryIdentifierDescription` in addition to network and Luhn fields
Recommended chain:
- `PAN Generate` -> `PAN Parse` -> `Card Validation Data Generate`
Use `PAN Generate` when:
- you want a Visa, Mastercard, American Express, or Discover PAN to feed into later recipes
Use `PAN Parse` when:
- you want to confirm network, card type hint, IIN, length, and Luhn validity before continuing
## 6) Generate / Verify Payment PIN Data
Operations:
- `PIN Data Generate`
- `PIN Data Verify`
> **Note:** Encrypted PIN block translation is implemented as `PIN Block Translate Encrypted` (section 7). Use `PIN Block Translate` for clear-format-to-format conversion only.
Use this when:
- you want AWS-style PIN-data naming for clear ISO 9564 block flows
Input:
- `PIN Data Generate`: clear PIN digits
- `PIN Data Verify`: clear PIN block hex
Important assumptions:
- these wrappers currently cover clear ISO formats `0`, `1`, and `3`
- encrypted PEK/BDK translation is still done by chaining lower-level steps
## 7) Build / Parse / Translate PIN Block
Operations:
- `PIN Block Build`
- `PIN Block Parse`
- `PIN Block Translate`
- `PIN Block Translate Encrypted`
Use this when:
- you want the lower-level clear PIN-block tools directly
- `PIN Block Translate Encrypted`: decrypt an encrypted PIN block under an incoming zone key (ZPK/PEK), optionally change format, and re-encrypt under an outgoing zone key — this is the acquirer's core PIN routing operation (issue #17)
Input:
- `PIN Block Build`: clear PIN digits
- `PIN Block Parse`: clear PIN block hex
- `PIN Block Translate`: clear PIN block hex
- `PIN Block Translate Encrypted`: encrypted PIN block hex (8 bytes / 16 hex chars)
Important assumptions:
- current clear-block support is ISO formats `0`, `1`, and `3`
- `PIN Block Translate Encrypted` uses TDES-ECB; accepts 2-key (16-byte) or 3-key (24-byte) keys
## 8) Issuer PIN Verification Helpers
Operations:
- `PIN IBM 3624 Offset Generate`
- `PIN IBM 3624 Verify`
- `VISA PVV Generate`
- `VISA PVV Verify`
Use this when:
- you need issuer-side PIN verification artifacts rather than PIN blocks
Input:
- clear PIN digits
Important assumptions:
- these helpers use clear PVKs in software
- IBM 3624 expects a decimalization table and validation data
- VISA PVV uses the common PAN/PVKI/PIN assembly described in the inline comments
## 9) Key Derivation, Generation, And Validation
Operations:
- `DUKPT Derive TDES Key` — TDES DUKPT (10-byte KSN, IPEK-based)
- `DUKPT Derive AES Key` — AES-128 DUKPT per ANSI X9.24-3 (12-byte KSN, IK-based)
- `Derive ECDH Key Material`
- `Key Generate` — random AES-128/192/256, TDES, or custom bytes; optional AES CMAC KCV
- `Key Component Split` — XOR-split a key into 2–8 components for key ceremony use
- `Key Component Combine` — XOR-combine components back into the original key
- `Payment Calculate KCV`
- `AS2805 Generate KEK Validation`
Use this when:
- you need transaction keys, shared secrets, random test keys, KCVs, or AS2805-style KEK-validation lab values
Important assumptions:
- `Key Component Split` and `Key Component Combine` use XOR shares — all N components are required to reconstruct the key (no threshold/Shamir scheme)
- These operations are intended for testing and emulation, not production key ceremonies — production ceremonies must use a certified HSM
- `DUKPT Derive TDES Key` is TDES DUKPT — do not confuse IPEK (TDES) with IK (AES DUKPT)
- `DUKPT Derive AES Key` implements AES-128 via AES-CMAC per ANSI X9.24-3; AES-192/256 are not yet implemented
- `Key Generate` is for test use only — production keys must be generated in an approved HSM
- `AS2805 Generate KEK Validation` is an emulation-oriented helper and explicitly documents its simplifications in the operation comments
## 10) Key Container And HSM Command Inspection
Operations:
- `HSM Parse Thales Command`
- `HSM Parse Futurex Command`
- `TR-31 Parse Key Block`
- `TR-34 Parse Key Transport`
Use this when:
- you need to inspect vendor HSM command syntax, wrapped-key material, or transport frames during testing
Input:
- `HSM Parse Thales Command`: raw legacy host command or response text
- `HSM Parse Futurex Command`: raw bracketed Excrypt command or response text
- `TR-31 Parse Key Block` / `TR-34 Parse Key Transport`: full payload as text or hex, depending on the operation comment
Important assumptions:
- the Thales and Futurex parsers currently focus on visible message syntax, delimiters, command identification, and field splitting rather than deep per-command semantic decoding
- `HSM Parse Thales Command` expects the configured message-header length to be supplied in the op args
- `HSM Parse Futurex Command` treats Excrypt messages as delimiter-based tag/value fields and commonly uses the `AO` field as the command code
- `TR-31 Parse Key Block` decodes all X9.143 header fields with descriptions and PCI compliance flags
- `TR-34 Parse Key Transport` handles B0–B9 message types, error codes, and peeks at the outer ASN.1 SEQUENCE of the CMS envelope
## Chaining Patterns
## A) TDES DUKPT MAC
Operations:
- `DUKPT Derive TDES Key`
- `MAC Generate`
Flow:
- derive the transaction key first if you want to inspect it
- or use a DUKPT MAC method directly in `MAC Generate`
- use the same KSN and BDK on verify
## B) AES DUKPT Key Derivation
Operations:
- `DUKPT Derive AES Key`
Flow:
- provide the 16-byte BDK (or IK if you already have it) as hex input
- provide the 12-byte KSN (8-byte IKI + 4-byte counter) in the args
- select "Working Key" and a purpose (PIN Encryption, MAC Generation, Data Encryption, etc.)
- use JSON output to inspect the full BDK → IK → transaction key → working key chain
## C) ECDH Wrap / Unwrap
Operations:
- `Derive ECDH Key Material`
- `AES Key Wrap`
- `AES Key Unwrap`
Flow:
- derive the shared secret
- optionally run a KDF if you need a specific KEK size
- feed the resulting key into `AES Key Wrap` or `AES Key Unwrap`
Important assumption:
- this is not a full TR-34 or AWS `TranslateKeyMaterial` implementation by itself
## D) Clear PIN Block To Encrypted PIN Data
Operations:
- `PIN Data Generate` or `PIN Block Build`
- `Payment Encrypt Data`
Flow:
- generate the clear ISO PIN block first
- encrypt that block under the desired AES or TDES profile
## E) EMV ARQC / ARPC Review
Operations:
- `EMV Generate ARQC`
- `EMV Verify ARQC`
- `EMV Generate ARPC`
Flow:
- build the exact request-data preimage outside the op
- generate or verify the ARQC with the derived session key
- build the response preimage and generate the ARPC
## F) EMV Script MAC And PIN Change
Operations:
- `EMV Generate MAC`
- `EMV Verify MAC`
- `EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change)`
Flow:
- assemble the issuer-script APDU body as hex
- use the derived integrity key
- append the already-encrypted PIN block when generating the PIN-change MAC
## G) IBM 3624 / PVV Verification
Operations:
- `PIN IBM 3624 Offset Generate`
- `PIN IBM 3624 Verify`
- `VISA PVV Generate`
- `VISA PVV Verify`
Flow:
- keep the clear PIN in the input field
- keep issuer validation data, PAN, PVKI, decimalization table, and PVK in the args
- use the JSON output when you need to inspect how the verification artifact was assembled
## H) Brand Test Card Setup
Operations:
- `PAN Generate`
- `PAN Parse`
- `Card Validation Data Generate`
- `PIN Data Generate`
Flow:
- generate a curated or locally generated brand-valid PAN
- parse it to confirm brand, card type hint, and Luhn validity
- feed the PAN into CVV, PIN, EMV, or parser recipes
## I) AS2805 KEK Validation
Operations:
- `AS2805 Generate KEK Validation`
- `Payment Calculate KCV`
Flow:
- inspect the KEK with `Payment Calculate KCV`
- generate request or response RandomKeySend / RandomKeyReceive values with the AS2805 helper
## J) Vendor Command Triage
Operations:
- `HSM Parse Thales Command`
- `HSM Parse Futurex Command`
Flow:
- paste the raw host message first before trying to interpret the business meaning
- use the parsed command code, delimiters, header, trailer, or tag/value split to confirm what family of command you are looking at
- follow with lower-level payment, EMV, PIN, or key-container recipes only after the transport syntax is understood
## K) Generate And Verify A Test Key
Operations:
- `Key Generate`
- `Payment Calculate KCV`
Flow:
- use `Key Generate` with JSON output to get a random AES-128/192/256 or TDES key plus its CMAC KCV
- cross-check the KCV with `Payment Calculate KCV` if you need to verify against an HSM-generated value
- pipe the hex key directly into derivation, MAC, or encryption recipes
## Validation Status
Validation classes:
- `Verified` — backed by a public standard or official vendor documentation plus deterministic local vectors
- `Vendor-aligned` — behavior is intentionally shaped to AWS Payment Cryptography or scheme/vendor semantics; the full underlying standard is not publicly auditable here
- `Externally cross-checked` — checked against known-good vectors or an external implementation; the governing spec is not public here
- `Test helper` — useful for testing, parsing, or workflow emulation but not a full standards-faithful implementation
Release guidance: `Publish` = safe with normal guardrails; `Publish with guardrails` = keep inline Validation/Security/Assumptions warnings visible.
| Operation | Validation | Primary source(s) | Release |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `PIN Block Build` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `GeneratePinData`; ISO 9564 | Publish with guardrails |
| `PIN Block Parse` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `VerifyPinData`; ISO 9564 | Publish with guardrails |
| `PIN Block Translate` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `TranslatePinData`; ISO 9564 | Publish with guardrails |
| `PIN Block Translate Encrypted` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `TranslatePinData`; ISO 9564; PCI PIN Req 3-3 | Publish with guardrails |
| `PIN Data Generate` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `GeneratePinData` | Publish with guardrails |
| `PIN Data Verify` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `VerifyPinData` | Publish with guardrails |
| `Key Component Split` | Verified | XOR key split — standard PCI key ceremony primitive | Publish with guardrails |
| `Key Component Combine` | Verified | XOR key combine — standard PCI key ceremony primitive | Publish with guardrails |
| `Payment Calculate KCV` | Verified | NIST SP 800-38B; generic AES/TDES/HMAC primitives | Publish |
| `DUKPT Derive TDES Key` | Externally cross-checked | ANSI X9.24-1; AWS DUKPT terminology | Publish with guardrails |
| `DUKPT Derive AES Key` | Externally cross-checked | ANSI X9.24-3 §6.3 official test vectors (x9.org) | Publish with guardrails |
| `Derive ECDH Key Material` | Verified | AWS `TranslateKeyMaterial`; AWS `EcdhDerivationAttributes`; RFC 3394 | Publish |
| `Payment Encrypt Data` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `EncryptData` | Publish with guardrails |
| `Payment Decrypt Data` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `DecryptData` | Publish with guardrails |
| `Payment Re-Encrypt Data` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `ReEncryptData` | Publish with guardrails |
| `MAC Generate` | Verified (HMAC/CMAC); Vendor-aligned (ISO9797/DUKPT/AS2805) | NIST SP 800-38B; AWS MAC overview | Publish with guardrails |
| `MAC Verify` | Verified (HMAC/CMAC); Vendor-aligned (ISO9797/DUKPT/AS2805) | NIST SP 800-38B; AWS MAC overview | Publish with guardrails |
| `EMV Generate MAC` | Vendor-aligned | AWS EMV MAC use case | Publish with guardrails |
| `EMV Verify MAC` | Vendor-aligned | AWS EMV MAC use case | Publish with guardrails |
| `EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change)` | Test helper | AWS `GenerateMacEmvPinChange` | Publish with guardrails |
| `EMV Generate ARQC` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `VerifyAuthRequestCryptogram` | Publish with guardrails |
| `EMV Verify ARQC` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `VerifyAuthRequestCryptogram` | Publish with guardrails |
| `EMV Generate ARPC` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `VerifyAuthRequestCryptogram` issuer flow | Publish with guardrails |
| `Card Validation Data Generate` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `GenerateCardValidationData` | Publish with guardrails |
| `Card Validation Data Verify` | Vendor-aligned | AWS `VerifyCardValidationData` | Publish with guardrails |
| `PIN IBM 3624 Offset Generate` | Vendor-aligned | AWS IBM 3624 PIN verification object | Publish with guardrails |
| `PIN IBM 3624 Verify` | Vendor-aligned | AWS IBM 3624 PIN verification object | Publish with guardrails |
| `VISA PVV Generate` | Vendor-aligned | AWS VISA PIN verification object | Publish with guardrails |
| `VISA PVV Verify` | Vendor-aligned | AWS VISA PIN verification object | Publish with guardrails |
| `AS2805 Generate KEK Validation` | Test helper | AWS `GenerateAs2805KekValidation` | Publish with guardrails |
| `PAN Generate` | Verified (Luhn/public ranges); Vendor-aligned (curated samples) | Discover public test-card page; Mastercard public AVS scenarios | Publish with guardrails |
| `PAN Parse` | Verified | Public card numbering rules | Publish |
| `TR-31 Parse Key Block` | Test helper | AWS `TranslateKeyMaterial` workflow context | Publish with guardrails |
| `TR-34 Parse Key Transport` | Test helper | AWS `TranslateKeyMaterial` workflow context | Publish with guardrails |
| `HSM Parse Thales Command` | Test helper | Thales payShield command syntax reference | Publish with guardrails |
| `HSM Parse Futurex Command` | Test helper | Futurex Excrypt command syntax reference | Publish with guardrails |
### Release Posture
- Publish the current payment surface with its existing inline warnings intact
- Do not describe the fork as a certified HSM, production key-custody platform, or PCI-scoped control surface
- Describe it as a software emulation and interoperability tool for development, testing, and education
Pre-publish checklist:
1. Rebuild Docker and confirm updated recipe descriptions are visible in the UI
2. Re-run the payment operation subset tests (`npm test` targeting `Payment.mjs`)
3. Spot-check `Populate test data` on argument-heavy operations
## APC Comparison Testing
Performed 2026-05-19. All HSM-mimic operations compared against AWS Payment Cryptography (APC) using fixed test vectors imported as APC managed keys. Keys were imported for testing only and scheduled for deletion immediately after.
### Test Vectors
| Name | Hex |
|---|---|
| `tdes_bdk` | `0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210` |
| `aes_bdk` | `FEDCBA98765432100123456789ABCDEF` |
| `tdes_dek1` | `0101010101010101FEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE` |
| `tdes_dek2` | `FEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE0101010101010101` |
| `tdes_m3` | `1111111111111111AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA` |
| `aes_m6` | `000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F` |
| `visa_pvk` | `AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFAAAABBBB` |
| `ibm3624_pvk` | `BBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFAAAABBBBCCCC` |
| `cvk` | `CCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFAAAABBBBCCCCDDDD` |
| `emv_e0` | `101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F` |
| `tdes_pek` | `DDDDEEEEFFFFAAAABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEE` |
| plaintext | `0102030405060708` |
| mac\_msg | `0102030405060708090A0B0C` |
| pan\_cvv | `4123456789012345` |
| pan\_pvv | `5432101234567890` |
| service\_code | `101` |
| pin | `1234` |
| ksn\_tdes | `FFFF9876543210E00001` |
| ksn\_aes | `123456789012345600000001` |
| atc | `0001` |
### Results
| Operation | CyberChef Output | APC Output | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Payment Encrypt Data (TDES ECB) | `B064B6C2571C65D5` | `B064B6C2571C65D5` | ✅ MATCH | |
| Payment Decrypt Data (TDES ECB) | `0102030405060708` | `0102030405060708` | ✅ MATCH | |
| Payment Re-Encrypt Data | — | API error | ❌ BLOCKED | D0 keys with `NoRestrictions` rejected by APC `re_encrypt_data` — key-mode constraint, not a CyberChef bug |
| MAC Generate (ISO 9797-3, Method 1) | `D8749ECF9A6C6932` | `D8749ECF9A6C6932` | ✅ MATCH | |
| MAC Verify (ISO 9797-3) | — | PASS | ✅ | |
| MAC Generate (AES-CMAC) | `E330EE80C0D43370` | `E330EE80C0D43370` | ✅ MATCH | |
| MAC Verify (AES-CMAC) | — | PASS | ✅ | |
| EMV Generate MAC | `BEB0A99CA833D7C8` (Method 2) | `1C36D79CE0F2F832` | ⚠️ METHOD DEPENDENT | Default (Method 2) does not match. Select Method 1 in the padding method arg for output that aligns with systems using zero-pad. |
| EMV Generate MAC (PIN Change) | `3D9E060686858CC0` | N/A | ⚠️ N/A | APC has no direct equivalent endpoint |
| Card Validation Data Generate (CVV) | `703` | `703` | ✅ MATCH | |
| Card Validation Data Generate (CVV2) | `111` | `111` | ✅ MATCH | |
| Card Validation Data Verify | — | PASS | ✅ | |
| VISA PVV Generate | `5596` (visa_pvk) / `6776` (test key) | `5596` / `6776` (verify path) | ✅ MATCH | APC `generate_pin_data` blocked by compliance warning; cross-validated via `verify_pin_data` for both keys |
| VISA PVV Verify | — | PASS | ✅ | Both `visa_pvk` (KCV AAAABBBB…) and test key `0123456789ABCDEF…` (KCV 08D7B4) confirmed via APC `verify_pin_data` |
| PIN IBM 3624 Offset Generate | `0324` | `0324` (verify path) | ✅ MATCH | Cross-validated via APC `verify_pin_data` |
| PIN IBM 3624 Verify | — | PASS | ✅ | |
| EMV Generate ARQC | `8C8E19CED4DBBF59` | AES-128 rejected | ❌ BLOCKED | APC `verify_auth_request_cryptogram` requires AES-256 E0 key; AES-128 rejected. CyberChef implementation (AES-CMAC, Option A session-key derivation) is correct |
| DUKPT Derive TDES Key | IPEK `6AC292FAA1315B4D858AB3A3D7D5933A` | N/A | ✅ VERIFIED | Matches published ANSI X9.24-1 test vector |
| DUKPT Derive AES Key | IK/working keys derived | N/A | ✅ VERIFIED | Verified against ANSI X9.24-3 §6.3 official test vectors; APC does not expose derived intermediate keys for direct comparison |
| DUKPT TDES Encrypt (Payment Encrypt Data) | `92A5157E4607D1B0` | `124F7A32F3F84187` | ❌ VARIANT MISMATCH | CyberChef follows ANSI X9.24-1 "Data" variant (bytes 5+13 XOR `0xFF`); APC uses an undocumented internal variant for data encryption |
| DUKPT TDES MAC (MAC Generate) | `AF59E7E8A06F01B2` | `AF59E7E8A06F01B2` | ✅ MATCH | APC `DukptKeyVariant=REQUEST` aligns with CyberChef "MAC Request" |
### Key Findings
- **APC `mac_length` is in nibbles (hex digits), not bytes** — pass `16` to get an 8-byte MAC.
- **EMV Generate MAC padding method** — `EMV Generate MAC` defaults to Method 2 (ISO 7816-4; standard for EMV issuer scripts). Select Method 1 (zero pad) when the receiving system requires it. Both generate and verify must use the same method.
- **DUKPT TDES data encryption variant** — CyberChef follows ANSI X9.24-1 standard (bytes 5 and 13 XOR `0xFF` for the "Data" variant). APC applies a different undocumented internal variant. DUKPT MAC operations align correctly (both use MAC Request / `REQUEST` variant).
- **EMV ARQC requires AES-256 on APC** — `verify_auth_request_cryptogram` rejects AES-128 E0 keys. If testing ARQC against APC, an AES-256 E0 master key is required. CyberChef's AES-CMAC + Option A session-key derivation is standard-compliant.
- **Re-encrypt key mode constraint** — D0 keys imported into APC with `NoRestrictions: true` are blocked by `re_encrypt_data`. This is an APC API constraint, not a CyberChef limitation.
---
### References
- AWS Payment Cryptography Data Plane API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/payment-cryptography/latest/DataAPIReference/Welcome.html
- AWS MAC overview: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/payment-cryptography/latest/userguide/crypto-ops-mac.html
- NIST SP 800-38B CMAC: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/38/b/upd1/final
- RFC 3394 AES Key Wrap: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3394
- Discover public test-card page: https://www.discoverglobalnetwork.com/resources/businesses/check-your-card-reader/
- Mastercard AVS test scenarios: https://static.developer.mastercard.com/content/mastercard-send-avs/uploads/avs-test-case-scenario-v4.pdf
- Payment card number background: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Payment_card_number
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